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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Karl Lonn appeals from the district court's Opinion and Order on State's 
Motion for Summary Disposition dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
Mr. Lonn asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction 
petition for being untimely, because he has had an appeal pending since 2008 that was 
never acted on. Therefore, his post-conviction petition is timely. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On October 1, 2008, Mr. Lonn was sentenced in Kootenai County No. CR-F06-
22265 to a unified sentence of twelve years, with five years fixed, for the crime of 
trafficking in heroin. (R., pp.1, 42.) Between October 24 and November 6, 2008, 
Mr. Lonn had four inmate request forms or "kites" sent to Judge John Luster, the 
presiding judge in his case. (R., pp.16, 19-22.) 1 The kites indicated that Mr. Lonn 
intended to appeal, and the last kite expressly stated: "I would like to pursue an appeal 
on the grounds that I was denied all the evidence to make the proper decision." 
(R., pp.19-22.) The judgment of conviction and sentence was entered on November 14, 
2008. (R., p.42.) Mr. Lonn did not file a formal notice of appeal from the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. (See R., pp.18, 42.) 
On August 8, 2011, Mr. Lonn filed, pro se, a petition and affidavit for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.1-7.) The State filed an answer to Mr. Lonn's petition. 
1 Unfortunately, the copies of the kites in the PDF version of the record are illegible. 
(R., pp.19-22.) Mr. Lonn will request that the record be augmented with legible copies 
of the kites. 
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(R., pp.8-10.) Mr. Lonn then filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp.11-15.) The State subsequently filed an amended answer to the petition, 
arguing that the petition was untimely. (R., pp.36-38.) 
The State then requested summary dismissal of the post-conviction petition, and 
the district court conducted a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal. (Tr., p.7, 
Ls.2-13.) The district court later entered an Opinion and Order on State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition. (R., pp.39-43.) The district court stated that, under Idaho 
Code§ 19-4902(a), the one-year limitation period to file a petition for post-conviction 
relief begins to run forty-three days after the entry of judgment, if no appeal is filed from 
the judgment. (R., p.41.) The district court also stated that Mr. Lonn "did not file an 
appeal," and that Mr. Lonn filed his petition for post-conviction relief "some two years 
and eight months after judgment was entered." (R., p.42.) The district court rejected 
Mr. Lonn's assertion that the facts of his case were analogous to those in Gosch v. 
State, 154 Idaho 71 (Ct. App. 2012),2 and essentially determined that equitable tolling 
did not apply. (R., p.42.) Thus, the district court granted the motion for summary 
dismissal "upon the grounds that the Petition for Post-conviction Relief was untimely 
Filed." (R., p.43.) 
2 The district court stated: 
In Gosch, the Court found the defendant clearly requested his counsel file 
an appeal, yet no appeal was filed. In the instant matter, Petitioner 
[Mr.] Lonn makes no such assertion. Petitioner [Mr.] Lonn concedes no 
appeal was filed and he asserts no facts that would allow the Court to find 
he ever requested his trial counsel file an appeal. Therefore, the Court is 
unable to find Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an 
appeal when no appeal was ever requested. 
(R., p.42.) 
2 
Mr. Lonn then filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's Opinion and 
Order on State's Motion for Summary Disposition. (R., pp.45-48.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Lonn's post-conviction petition for being 
untimely filed, because he has a pending appeal and therefore his post-conviction 
petition is timely? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dimissed Mr. Lonn's Post-Conviction Petition For 
Being Untimely Filed, Because He Has A Pending Appeal And Therefore His Post-
Conviction Petition Is Timely 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Lonn asserts that the district court erred when it dismissed his post-
conviction petition for being untimely filed, because he still has a pending appeal that 
was never acted upon and therefore his post-conviction petition is timely. While 
Mr. Lonn did not file a formal notice of appeal as an attorney would, his action in 
sending kites to the district court was the functional equivalent of filing a notice of 
appeal. Thus, his appeal is still pending. Because Mr. Lonn's appeal is pending, his 
post-conviction petition is timely. The district court therefore erred when it dismissed his 
petition for being untimely filed. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief pursuant to a motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. A 
district court may grant a motion for summary disposition of the post-conviction 
application "when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment ad 
a matter of law." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80 (2002) (citing I.C. § 19-
4906(c)). When reviewing the dismissal of a post-conviction application without an 
evidentiary hearing, the appellate court "will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admission together with any affidavits 
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on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party." Id. 
C. Mr. Lonn Has A Pending Appeal, Because His Action In Sending Kites To The 
District Court Was The Functional Equivalent Of Filing A Notice Of Appeal 
Mr. Lonn asserts that he has a pending appeal, because his action in sending 
kites to the district court was the functional equivalent of filing a notice of appeal. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4902(a), a post-conviction proceeding must be 
started by the filing of a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration of the 
time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of 
proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." The failure to file a timely post-
conviction petition is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189 (2001 ). 
An appeal as a matter of right from a decision of a district court may only be 
made by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court within forty-two days 
of the district court's final order. See I.AR. 14(a). A notice of appeal must "contain 
substantially" the title of the action or proceeding, the title of the court, the case number, 
the parties, a statement of the issues, a designation of what documents the appellant 
requests to be included in the record on appeal, and an expression of whether a 
transcript is requested. I.AR. 17. The failure to timely file a notice of appeal is a 
jurisdictional defect that causes automatic dismissal of an appeal. I.AR. 21. 
However, a party may timely file a notice of appeal for purposes of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules without filing a formal notice of appeal. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
held that, "where a litigant files documents with the court within the time limit required by 
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the rules and those documents give notice to other parties and the courts of a litigant's 
intent to appeal as required by the rules, those documents can be effective as a notice 
of appeal." Baker v. State. 142 Idaho 411, 419 (Ct. App. 2005). 
The Baker Court based its conclusion on prior decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 418-19. In Smith v. Barry, 
the United States Supreme Court decision cited in Baker, the issue was whether a 
timely appellant's brief could be considered adequate as a notice of appeal. Smith v. 
Barry, 502 U.S. 244 (1992). The Smith Court held that the appellant's brief could 
substitute for a notice of appeal if it contained required information. Id. at 248-50. The 
Court reasoned: "When papers are technically at variance with the letter of [a rule), a 
court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant's 
action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires." Id. at 248 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The Baker Court observed that the Ninth Circuit similarly 
permits documents which are not denominated as a notice of appeal to 
serve the function of such a notice when the documents: (1) demonstrate 
that the party intended to appeal; (2) are served upon the other parties to 
the litigation; and (3) are filed in court within the time period required by 
the appellate rule. 
Baker, 142 Idaho at 419 (citing Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 
1986); Rabin v. Cohen, 570 F.2d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 1978)).3 
3 In another Ninth Circuit case (not cited in Bakery, the appellate court "received a pro 
se letter from [an inmate] which referred to the district court's order revoking probation 
and indicated that [the inmate] sought to 'get the sentence reduced."' Brannan v. U.S., 
993 F.2d 709, 710 (9th Cir. 1993). The Brannan Court concluded: "Because this letter 
evinces an intent to appeal from the district court's .... order, we construe [the 
inmate's] letter as a notice of appeal." Id. 
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In Baker, an inmate filed timely motions to proceed in forma pauperis and for 
appointment of counsel on appeal, with accompanying affidavits for both motions. 
Baker, 142 Idaho at 418. The affidavit in support of the motion to proceed in forma 
pauperis indicated that the nature of the action was to appeal the denial of the inmate's 
second post-conviction petition. Id. at 419. The motions and affidavits also indicated 
the parties, case number, and court. Id. "Thus, although [the inmate] did not timely file 
a document which was denominated as a notice of appeal, the documents he did file 
substantially contained the information required under Rule 17." Id. The district court 
granted the motion for appointment of counsel on appeal, and the appeal was filed and 
forwarded to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. 
The Baker Court stated that the motions and affidavits "were filed within the time 
limit for filing an appeal and those documents notified the state and the district court of 
[the inmate's] intent to appeal." Id. Further, "[t]he district court's interpretation of [the 
inmate's] motions and affidavits and the appeal's unhindered progress through the 
appellate system persuasively demonstrate that those documents, which were timely 
filed by [the inmate], contained sufficient information to comply with the requirement that 
a timely notice of appeal be filed." Id. The Court also stated that it would not "exalt form 
over substance." Id. Thus, the Idaho Court of Appeals held in Baker that the inmate's 
"action in filing the motions and affidavits was the functional equivalent of filing a notice 
of appeal." Id. 
Here, the district court stated that Mr. Lonn did not file an appeal. (R., p.42.) 
The district court also stated that Mr. Lonn "concedes in his affidavit that no appeal was 
filed and he makes no assertion that he requested his counsel file an appeal." 
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(R., p.42.) Thus, the district court determined that "the statute of limitations for the filing 
of a post-conviction petition began to run forty-three (43) days after entry of the 
November 14, 2008 judgment of conviction. [Mr.] Lonn filed his Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief on August 8, 2011, some two years and eight months after judgment 
was entered." (R., p.42.) After essentially determining that equitable tolling did not 
apply, the district court granted the State's motion for summary dismissal "upon the 
grounds that the Petition for Post-conviction Relief was untimely Filed." (R., pp.42-43.) 
However, while Mr. Lonn did not file a formal notice of appeal, his action in 
sending the kites to the district court was the functional equivalent of filing a notice of 
appeal.4 Although Mr. Lonn did not file a formal notice of appeal, his kites substantially 
contained the information required under Rule 17, because they indicated the nature of 
the action, the parties, case number, and court. See Baker, 142 Idaho at 419. Further, 
his action in sending the kites to the district court was done within the time limit for filing 
an appeal. See id. Thus, Mr. Lonn's kites were effective as a notice of appeal. See id. 
Mr. Lonn indicated in the kites that he intended to appeal. The kite dated 
October 24, 2008 stated that Mr. Lonn's attorneys had not provided him a copy of the 
grand jury transcripts, and that he wanted a copy of the "Grand Jury report." (R., p.19.) 
In the kite dated October 28, 2008, Mr. Lonn stated, "I need the information to file an 
appeal on my case." (R., p.20.) "Because I am waiting for state transport, I'm afraid of 
being caught between a rock and a hard place with regards to filing my appeal in the 
4 In reference to the kites, the district court stated that Mr. Lonn "wrote to the District 
Court on four occasions after he was sentenced by prior to judgment being entered, 
indicating he wanted a copy of the grand jury transcript so that he could decide whether 
to file an appeal." (R., p.42 n.1.) "However, [Mr. Lonn] has provided no evidence that 
he at any time contacted his attorney to request an appeal be filed." (R., p.42 n.1.) 
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required time period." (R., p.20.) In the kite dated October 30, 2008, Mr. Lonn informed 
the district court that, because "[t]he time is approaching when my ability to file an 
appeal will lapse," he needed to examine the documents from the grand jury 
proceedings. (R., p.21.) The above kites indicated that Mr. Lonn intended to appeal. 
More importantly, Mr. Lonn's final kite expressly stated that he wished to file an 
appeal, and indicated the nature of the action. In the kite dated November 6, 2008, he 
stated: "I would like to pursue an appeal on the grounds that I was denied all the 
evidence to make the proper decision." (R., p.22.) In the words of Mr. Lonn's counsel 
at the motion hearing, "quite clearly [Mr. Lonn] had requested his appeal." (Tr., p.9, 
Ls.23-24.) In short, Mr. Lonn's kites indicated that he intended to appeal and indicated 
the nature of the action. See Baker, 142 Idaho at 418-19; see also Brannan, 993 F.2d 
at 710. 
Mr. Lonn's kites also indicated the case number and court. The November 6 kite 
listed the case number, "CR 06-22265." (R., p.22.) The kites were all addressed to 
Judge Luster, the presiding judge in Mr. Lonn's case. (R., pp.19-22.) 
Additionally, the kites gave notice to the other parties of Mr. Lonn's intent to 
appeal. The November 6 kite indicated that it was routed to Judge Luster at the district 
court, and that a photocopy was sent to defense counsel. (R., p.22.) As Mr. Lonn's 
counsel informed the district court at the motion hearing, when Judge Luster receives 
"an ex-parte communication from an inmate in the form of what is commonly referred to 
as a kite or the inmate requests forms which are attached as exhibits to the verified 
petition . . . the practice in the First District is to forward those requests to the 
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prosecutors and to counsel." (Tr., p.10, Ls.1-7.) Thus, the kites gave notice to the 
parties that Mr. Lonn intended to appeal. See Baker, 142 Idaho at 419. 
Mr. Lonn's request to file an appeal was timely. As discussed above, a notice of 
appeal must be filed with the district court clerk "within 42 days from the date evidenced 
by the filing stamp of the clerk of the court on any judgment or order of the district court 
appealable as a matter of right in any ... criminal action." I.AR. 14(a). Thus, if the 
appealable judgment or order here is the October 1, 2008 sentencing ( See R., pp.1, 11-
12), then Mr. Lonn's action in sending the kites by November 6, 2008 was "within the 
time limit required by the rules." See I.AR. 14(a); Baker, 142 Idaho at 419. 
However, the judgment was not entered until November 14, 2008. (R., p.42.) If 
the appealable judgment or order is the November 14, 2008 judgment, Mr. Lonn's 
action in sending the kites may have been premature. But even if that action had been 
premature, that would not render Mr. Lonn's functional request for an appeal untimely. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals, based on Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(2), has recognized 
"that a premature notice of appeal-filed after pronouncement of an otherwise 
appealable decision but before entry of a written order, decree or judgment-is not a 
nullity but is held in abeyance and matures upon filing by the clerk of a formal written 
judgment, order or decree." State v. Gissel, 105 Idaho 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(quoting I.AR. 17(e)(2)). If Mr. Lonn's kites were premature, then the kites would have 
matured under Rule 17(e)(2) upon entry of the judgment, because they were sent after 
pronouncement of the sentence but before entry of the judgment. (See R., p.18.) Thus, 
in any event, Mr. Lon n's action in sending the kites was timely. See Gissel, 105 Idaho 
at 291. 
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In sum, Mr. Lonn's kites were "effective as a notice of appeal," because the kites 
were sent "within the time limit required by the rules" and gave "notice to other parties 
and the courts of a litigant's intent to appeal as required by the rules." See Baker, 142 
Idaho at 419. Mr. Lonn's action in sending the kites to the district court was the 
functional equivalent of filing a notice of appeal. See id. Because the kites were 
effective as a notice of appeal, Mr. Lonn has a pending appeal that has yet to be acted 
on by the district court. 
D. Because Mr. Lonn Has A Pending Appeal, His Post-Conviction Petition Is Timely 
Mr. Lonn asserts that, because he has a pending appeal, his post-conviction 
petition is timely. Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction 
petition for being untimely filed. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "generally post-conviction relief is 
available while an appeal is pending." Parsons v. State, 113 Idaho 421, 425 (Ct. App. 
1987) (interpreting an earlier version of I.C. § 19-4902). As discussed above, a post-
conviction application "may be filed at any time with in one ( 1) year from the expiration of 
the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination of a 
proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-4902(a). The Parsons 
Court could not see how the earlier version of this provision (which had a five-year 
period) "bars post-conviction proceedings in which an appeal is pending." Parsons, 113 
Idaho at 425. 
The general availability of post-conviction relief during a pending appeal has 
exceptions: because "any claim or issue which was or could have been raised on 
appeal may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings ... if the post-conviction 
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application is grounded in the same facts and issues presented on appeal, summary 
dismissal is appropriate." Id. at 425-26. Conversely, "post-conviction proceedings do 
not preclude claims or issues based upon facts beyond the record presented on appeal, 
if those facts could not, or customarily would not, have been developed in the trial on 
criminal charges." Id. at 426 (citing I.C. § 19-4901(b) and State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 
516 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
Post-conviction relief is available in this case, because Mr. Lonn's pending 
appeal and his post-conviction proceeding are grounded in different facts and issues. 
Mr. Lonn's ground for appeal (as articulated in the November 6 kite) was "that I was 
denied all the evidence to make the proper decision." (R., p.22.) Specifically, Mr. Lonn 
"was not allowed to read the Grand Jury [transcripts] until 3 months after my plea," and 
never heard the recording or saw any pictures relevant to his case. (R., p.22.) 
In contrast, the grounds for his post-conviction petition (as articulated in the 
amended petition) were that "the Judgment and Sentence are in violation of the 
Constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho," that "there are material facts, 
not previously presented and heard that require vacation of the conviction in the 
interests of justice," and that "the Judgment and Sentence are subject to collateral 
attack on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel."5 (R., pp.12-13.) With 
respect to at least the second and third grounds for the post-conviction petition, those 
grounds are based upon facts that would be beyond the record presented on appeal 
5 Mr. Lonn stated in the November 6 kite that "I suppose (from what I've gathered in 
here) that it will be on the grounds of ineffective [counsel]." (R., p.22.) An ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is usually properly raised in a post-conviction proceeding. 
State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427,433 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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and not customarily developed in the district court. See Parsons, 113 Idaho at 426; see 
also State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 433 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is an issue rarely appropriate on direct appeal from a judgment or conviction; 
rather it is usually reserved for post-conviction relief proceedings, where a more 
complete evidentiary record can be developed."). 
Thus, post-conviction relief is available to Mr. Lonn while his appeal is pending. 
See Parsons, 113 Idaho at 425. Because post-conviction relief is available to Mr. Lonn 
while his appeal is pending, his post-conviction petition is timely. See l.C. § 19-4902(a). 
In sum, Mr. Lonn has a pending appeal because his action in sending the kites to 
the district court was the functional equivalent of filing a notice of appeal. Because 
post-conviction is available to Mr. Lonn while his appeal is pending, his post-conviction 
petition is timely. Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed his post-conviction 
petition for being untimely. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Lonn respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court's Opinion and Order on State's Motion for Summary Disposition dismissing 
his post-conviction petition, and remand his case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2013. 
/~ ,/1/ e'J,-7..-~ -----
/ -· v =:>s:= 
BEN PATRICK MCGREEW 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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